Polmar sets out to provide as complete a history of the U-2 program as possible. At most levels, he succeeds. He opens with a brief introduction to early U.S. efforts to acquire aerial intelligence and describes the growing desire within the American government for a spy plane that could photograph the Soviet Union while remaining invulnerable to its defenses. The real strength of Polmar's discussion is his analysis of the technical development of the U-2 program. He provides the technical specifications of each version of the U-2 as well as descriptions of the camera equipment they carried. Additionally, he discusses the history of each U-2 flight.
While the U-2's history is generally known, Polmar provides details that have never previously been disclosed. He shows how the CIA and Air Force used the U-2 to photograph numerous countries and concludes that these flights influenced U.S. policies by disproving the existence of bomber and missile gaps, revealing the presence of missile sites in Cuba, and clarifying activities in the Middle East. While this information is not new to the scholarly community, Polmar presents it in detail unseen before.
For all of its strengths, Polmar's book suffers from a few problems. He sometimes glosses over analysis of the U-2's impact on decision makers. He argues "the overflights provided President Eisenhower and his advisors with unambiguous intelligence" (p. 3). From Eisenhower's perspective this was probably true, but many of his advisers remained unsure of Soviet capabilities. In reality, the U-2's coverage of the Soviet Union was limited. Polmar could have strengthened his arguments by more carefully examining the actual use of the U-2 intelligence. Furthermore, he accuses the CIA of misleading and lying to the president about the Soviet Union's ability to detect, track, and shoot down a U-2. While Polmar does show that the CIA sometimes gave the president inaccurate information, he is less convincing in arguing the deception was deliberate. His own evidence seems to indicate that the CIA did clarify the plane's vulnerability, as it became known.
Despite these relatively minor shortcomings, Polmar's book is a major addition to our understanding of intelligence gathering during the Cold War. It definitely belongs on the bookshelf next to the works of William Burrows, Lawrence Freedman, John Prados, and Jeffrey Richelson.
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